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Section 6(2)(b) and the Problem of Dual Jurisdiction under GST

Adv. Gaurav Gupta

The architecture of the GST regime is premised on cooperative federalism, ensuring that both the Centre and States share fiscal and administrative powers within a unified tax structure.  While GST replaced a multiplicity of central and state levies, its administration remains shared between two parallel authorities—the Centre and the States—each exercising powers under mirror enactments. This dual structure, though essential to fiscal federalism, created a recurring conflict in enforcement: both wings often initiated separate proceedings on the same taxpayer and for the same transactions, resulting in duplication, jurisdictional overlap, and conflicting adjudications. To prevent such parallel action, Parliament enacted Section 6(2)(b) of the CGST Act, which mandates that once a “proper officer” under one enactment has initiated proceedings on a subject matter, the other authority shall not re-initiate proceedings on the same subject. The phrase, however, gave rise to interpretational uncertainty—what constitutes “initiation of proceedings,” and what is the “same subject matter”? The Supreme Court in Armour Security (India) Ltd. decisively resolved these ambiguities, laying down guiding tests for overlap and coordination between authorities, and restoring the equilibrium between administrative efficiency and federal comity in the GST regime.  This article discusses the various aspects of the provision and verdict.

The Law

Sections 3 and 4 of the CGST Act, 2017 (references to CGST Act would include reference to parallel state GST Acts) empower the government to appoint GST officers.   Section 5 empowers the Board to notify the powers which is conferred on an officer of the central tax to discharge the duties conferred on him under the Act.  Thus, all functions relating to the administration of the tax system are provided in both statutes, and officers are empowered by both the Central and State governments to undertake all such functions.  Thus, for every taxpayer, there is a dual authority with two officers, and they should have been exercising their functions in respect of the respective acts.  However, to avoid such dual exercise of power, Section 6 of the CGST Act, 2017, is the statutory fulcrum for this cooperative model. It provides for cross-empowerment of officers of Central and State tax administrations, enabling either to act as the “proper officer” for enforcement, assessment, and adjudication.  The idea of cross empowerment was brought in to ensure a single interface for the purpose of tax administration under the respective GST Enactment.  Thus, a single authority (either State or Centre) is empowered to undertake all functions from registration, assessment, adjudication to cancellation for a single taxpayer.  However, the GST Council in its 9th meeting held on 16-1-2017 made a recommendation in relation to cross-empowerment of both tax authorities for the enforcement of intelligence-based action, as recorded in para 28 of Agenda note no. 3 which reads as follows:-

“viii. Both the Central and State tax administrations shall have the power to take intelligence-based enforcement action in respect of the entire value chain”

The above decision is also explained by way of D.O.F. No. CBEC/20/43/01/2017-GST (Pt.) dated 05.10.2018 as under:

 It is accordingly clarified that the officers of both Central tax and State tax are authorized to initiate intelligence based enforcement action on the entire taxpayer’s base irrespective of the administrative assignment of the taxpayer to any authority. The authority which initiates such action is empowered to complete the entire process of investigation, issuance of SCN, adjudication, recovery, filing of appeal etc. arising out of such action.

Thus, when the law was aimed to have a single interface, in order to curb evasions, both authorities are entrusted with enforcement powers, which again open gates for initiation of parallel investigations.  To overcome this issue as well, the Acts provides a proper barrier to avoid duplication of proceedings. Clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 6 of the CGST Act, 2017 carves out an important jurisdictional restraint:

“Where a proper officer under the State Goods and Services Tax Act or the Union Territory Goods and Services Tax Act has initiated any proceedings on a subject matter, no proceedings shall be initiated by the proper officer under this Act on the same subject matter.”

The Issue

The provision thus prevents parallel proceedings on the same subject matter by both Central and State authorities. The issue that has long vexed courts is the meaning of “initiated any proceedings” and the scope of “same subject matter.” Does a search, summons, or investigation qualify as a “proceeding,” or must there be a formal show-cause notice or adjudication?

The Verdict

The Supreme Court in Armour Security (India) Ltd.[1] delivered a landmark pronouncement resolving conflicting High-Court views on the ambit of Section 6(2)(b).  In the impugned case, the taxpayer, registered under Delhi GST, was subjected to a search and summons by the Central GST authorities even though the State authorities had already issued a show-cause notice under Section 73 for the same period and issue—wrongful ITC from cancelled suppliers. The taxpayer argued that the Central summons were without jurisdiction under Section 6(2)(b).  The Question examined by the Court was whether issuance of summons under Section 70 constitutes “initiation of proceedings” within Section 6(2)(b).

The Court examined what constitutes ‘initiation of proceedings’ within the meaning of Section 6(2)(b). It held that this phrase cannot be equated with the commencement of a mere investigation, search, or summons. Such actions, the Court reasoned, are only inquiries undertaken under Section 67 or Section 70 for the purpose of collecting evidence and do not culminate in the determination of liability. The bar under Section 6(2)(b) is attracted only when adjudicatory proceedings are formally set in motion — that is, when a show-cause notice (SCN) under Section 73 or 74 is issued. The issuance of an SCN marks the transition from inquiry to adjudication; it is at that point that a “proceeding” in the legal sense commences, because it identifies the contravention, specifies the period, quantifies the demand, and calls upon the taxpayer to respond. The Court therefore made it explicit that mere issuance of summons or initiation of verification proceedings cannot amount to initiation of proceedings under Section 6(2)(b); the statutory bar becomes operative only when an SCN has been issued by one authority.

Having drawn this distinction, the Court turned to the meaning of ‘subject matter’ — a term which it found had been variously and sometimes loosely interpreted by High Courts. Rejecting the view that the subject matter is to be identified merely with the taxpayer or the financial year, the Court held that the term refers to the cause and foundation of the demand itself — namely, the specific tax liability, infraction or contravention which forms the core of the adjudication. The “subject matter” is thus the particular wrong that is alleged, such as the wrongful availment of input tax credit on a set of invoices, or the short payment of output tax on a particular series of transactions, rather than the broad fact of a proceeding against a given person. Consequently, if two proceedings deal with distinct factual matrices — for instance, one concerning suppression of outward supplies and another concerning ineligible ITC from fake vendors — they cannot be said to share the same subject matter, even if they pertain to the same tax period or assessee.

The Court further clarified that the bar under Section 6(2)(b) applies where there is complete or even partial overlapping of the subject matter. This means that if the second proceeding covers the same transactions or the same cause of demand, even in part, the subsequent authority is divested of jurisdiction to that extent. Where the overlap is total — for example, when both Central and State officers issue show-cause notices alleging wrongful ITC on the same invoices for the same period — the second proceeding is wholly without jurisdiction. Where the overlap is partial, the bar operates proportionately: the subsequent authority may proceed only for the period or issues not already covered by the earlier proceedings.

Thus, Hon’ble Supreme Court in Armour Security provided a coherent and workable test that harmonizes administrative convenience with taxpayer protection. “Initiation” is attached to the issuance of the show-cause notice, marking the beginning of adjudicatory proceedings, and “subject matter” refers to the concrete tax liability or contravention that is the foundation of the proceeding. The prohibition under Section 6(2)(b) thus operates not qua the taxpayer of the year, but qua the identity of the controversy. By recognizing that the bar applies even to partial overlaps, the Court ensured that duplication is avoided in both letter and spirit. This interpretation not only prevents double jeopardy in fiscal adjudication but also reinforces the federal balance between the Centre and the States by ensuring that once one authority takes up a matter, the other must defer and coordinate, thereby preserving the seamless “single interface” administration envisaged under the GST regime.

The Supreme Court rejected the proposition that a summons or investigation equals “initiation of proceedings.” It held that the expression “any proceedings” refers to adjudicatory proceedings such as those under Sections 73 or 74, not to inquiry or investigation stages. The Court reasoned that an “inquiry” under Section 70 is pre-adjudicatory, intended only to collect evidence and information.  It was held that proceedings under Section 6(2)(b) begin only when a show-cause notice is issued, thereby crystallizing a cause of action and a subject matter of dispute.

The above principle was applied by the Bombay High Court in Ravi Steel Industries [Writ Petition (L) No. 28245 of 2024 – Bombay High Court], where the State authorities had already adjudicated ITC disputes for FYs 2017–18 and 2018–19, and the Central authorities later issued a composite notice covering FYs 2017–18 to 2022–23. The High Court, following Armour Security, held that while the bar under Section 6(2)(b) precluded the Central authorities from re-adjudicating the first two years already covered by the State, they were competent to proceed for the remaining later years. The Court thus recognized that the overlap need not be absolute; even a partial intersection of subject matter attracts the bar to the extent of duplication.

The Orissa High Court in Tansam Engineering and Construction Co. v. Commissioner, CGST & Central Excise, Rourkela, [W.P. (C) No. 15935 OF 2025 (Orissa)] went a step further by quashing the entire Central proceedings where the State authorities had already issued a DRC-01 and completed adjudication for identical suppliers, invoices, and periods. In that case, both sets of proceedings were founded upon the same tax evasion report and involved precisely the same factual and legal allegations. Applying the Supreme Court’s formulation, the High Court held that the subject matter was identical in every respect and therefore the subsequent Central show-cause notice, order-in-original, and DRC-07 were all invalid and non est. Importantly, the Court in Tansam reiterated the Supreme Court’s observation that Section 6(2)(b) embodies a principle of administrative comity: once one authority — whether Central or State — has initiated proceedings on a particular subject matter, it is that authority alone which must carry the matter to its logical conclusion.

The Application of the understanding

From Armour Security, reinforced by Tansam Engineering and Ravi Steel Industries, the following coordinated understanding emerges:

Scenario Nature of the Overlap Whether Section 6(2)(b) Bar Applies Explanation / Judicial Analogy
1. State issues SCN under Section 74 for wrongful ITC on invoices of M/s A Traders for FY 2018–19; Central DGGI later issues SCN for the same FY and the same invoices alleging identical contravention. Complete overlap of period, cause, and transactions. Yes — Bar applies in full. Both proceedings deal with the same liability; the second authority lacks jurisdiction. (Same as Tansam Engineering, Orissa HC.)
2. State adjudication covers FYs 2017–18 and 2018–19 for ITC irregularities; Central SCN covers FYs 2017–18 to 2022–23 on the same issue. Partial overlap (2017–18 & 2018–19 common). Yes — Bar applies to overlapping years only; Central may proceed for later years. The Supreme Court and Bombay HC in Ravi Steel Industries held that the bar operates “to the extent of overlap.”
3. State issues SCN for short payment of outward tax on sales; Central issues SCN for wrongful availment of ITC from fake suppliers, both for FY 2019–20. Same period but different cause of demand. No — Distinct subject matters. “Subject matter” means the foundation of the demand, not merely the year or assessee.
4. State issues only DRC-01A (pre-notice intimation) invoking Section 74; no SCN issued; Central DGGI thereafter issues SCN for the same issue and period. Pre-adjudicatory step by State, no formal proceeding initiated. No — No initiation by State; bar not triggered. Armour Security and Tansam Engineering clarify that only an SCN counts as initiation; DRC-01A or summons do not.
5. State issues SCN for FY 2018–19 regarding invoices of M/s A Traders; Central issues SCN for FY 2018–19 regarding invoices of M/s B Traders (different suppliers). Same year but different transactions. No — Subject matters distinct. Each notice concerns a different set of supplies; hence no duplication.
6. Central initiates Section 74 proceeding for FY 2019–20 on ITC fraud; State later issues SCN covering FY 2019–20 and FY 2020–21 on the same suppliers. Partial overlap (FY 2019–20 common). Yes — Bar applies for 2019–20; State may proceed for 2020–21. Once one authority initiates, the other is ousted for that issue and year.
7. State issues SCN for misclassification of goods under wrong HSN; Central issues SCN for same supplies alleging short payment of tax due to under-valuation. Same transactions but different legal grounds of demand. Likely Yes — Functional overlap, same tax liability. Both proceedings arise from the same taxable supplies; effectively the same subject matter despite different labels.
8. Central completes adjudication for FY 2017–18 and passes OIO; State later issues fresh SCN on the same contravention for same year. Identical subject matter already adjudicated. Yes — Bar applies absolutely; subsequent proceeding non est. Section 6(2)(b) prevents re-adjudication once one authority has concluded proceedings.
9. Central issues SCN for FY 2020–21; State issues SCN for FY 2018–19. Different years, no factual overlap. No — Each proceeding independent. No temporal or transactional intersection; hence both valid.
10. Both Centre and State issue SCNs for “fake ITC” based on same intelligence report but different recipients (distinct GSTINs). Common source of intelligence but different taxpayers. No — Different assessees, hence different subject matters. Section 6(2)(b) applies qua subject matter of a proceeding, not qua source of investigation.

 

Conclusion

The key takeaways from the above verdicts are summarised as under:

  1. Cooperative Federalism and “Single Interface”: Armour Security restores the coordinated administrative balance envisaged in GST Council deliberations. Section 6 prevents taxpayers from being pulled into parallel proceedings while ensuring that information flows between authorities through the common GST portal (Section 146).
  2. Inquiry vs. Proceeding: By differentiating inquiry (Section 70) from proceeding (Sections 73–74), the Court provides a jurisprudential demarcation that avoids premature jurisdictional challenges to investigative actions.  This would also make sure that the investigations are put to rest and the bar of Section 6(2)(b) would operate if the other authority issues SCN on the same subject matter despite the first authority initiating the proceedings on such subject matter first.  Thus, the authority which will matter will not be the one which took up the issue first but which concluded the SCN on the issue first.
  3. The “Same Subject Matter” Test: The “same subject matter” is transaction-specific, not person-specific. Thus, distinct SCNs for different periods or contraventions are permissible even if issued by different authorities, provided they do not overlap.
  4. Harmonious Construction with Circular 05.10.2018: The Circular, reproduced in the judgment, clarifies that whichever authority initiates intelligence-based enforcement shall complete the entire chain of action. Armour Security gives this executive instruction judicial force.
  5. Functional Implications: While Investigations can still be conducted by either authority, adjudication on the same contravention cannot be duplicated.  Thus, Taxpayers gain protection from repetitive demands; authorities gain clarity on their operational limits.

The Armour Security ruling establishes that Section 6(2)(b) is a shield against multiplicity, not a sword to obstruct investigation. It balances the investigative freedom of both Central and State wings with the taxpayer’s right to a single adjudication on any subject matter.  Thus, while retaining the autonomy of the two authorities, it ensures that the authorities respect each other’s action on a subject matter in case of an assessee and strengthens the spirit of cooperative federalism in making the administration of GST a real success.

Adv. Gaurav Gupta

+91 98110 13940

ggupta.adv@gmail.com

 

[1]      Armour Security (India) Ltd. v. Commissioner, CGST, Delhi East Commissionerate, 2025 INSC 982 / [2025] 177 taxmann.com 478 (SC)

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